DUBROVNIK CONFERENCE [11 - 18 APRIL] PAPER

STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT

FRIEDMAN ACCEPTS PRINCIPLES THAT ARE A PRIORI IN A RELATIVE SENSE

HOW USEFULL THE WEAK RELATIVE A PRIORI IS? NOT MUCH.

THEY ARE REVISABLE IN CONDITIONS OF EMPIRICAL PRESSURE

THIS MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO HOLD THAT THEY ARE A PRIORI AT ALL

TRADITIONALLY REVISABILITY IN SCIENCE IS EMPIRICAL REVISABILITY
HOWEVER, THERE IS ANOTHER TYPE OF REVISABILITY WHICH TAKES PLACE
FOLLOWING KUHN, TE IN SCIENCE PLAY IMPORTANT ROLE ON THE EDGE OF A PARADIGM SHIFT

FOLLOWING AN INFLUENTIAL CONTEMPORATY INTERPRETATION OF TE IN SCIENCE [JIM BROWN] SOME TE COULD BE CONSIDERED AS A PRIORI
IF SOME OF THEM HAPPEN TO REVISE PRINCIPLES OF A FRIEDMANIAN TYPE THAT WOULD PRESENT A CASE WHERE A PRIORI PRINCIPLES WERE A PRIORI REVISED

IN THIS WAY WE 1. KEEP THE FALLIBILITY OF THE [A PRIORI] PRINCIPLES, 2. PRESERVE THEIR SUGGESTED EPISTEMIC CHARACTER [A PRIORI] AND SHOW [COMPATIBLE WITH GENERAL KUHNIAN FRAMEWORK] THAT FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN SCIENCE SOMETIMES GOT REVISED BY A PRIORI REASONING

WITH BROWN I ARGUE THAT SUCH CASES ACTUALLY EXIST IN HISTORY OF SCIENCE

I ARGUE THAT PRS IS EXAMPLE OF A PRIORI PRINCIPLE WHICH IS REVISED A PRIORI THROUGH A TE [EINSTEIN’S TTE]

AT THE END I PRESENT SHORT DEFENSE AGAINST NORTON’S CRITICISM

ON THE BASIS OF THIS I ARGUE THAT FRIEDMAN’S PRINCIPLES HAVE MUCH BIGGER POTENTIAL TO BE A PRIORI THAN THE WEAK ONE SUGGESTED. BROWN’S INTERPRETATION OF TE IF SUCCESSFUL WOULD COMPLEMENT THIS EPISTEMIC PROBLEM IN FRIEDMAN’S THEORETICAL MODEL.